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Abstract
Background: Good decision-making requires gathering and using sufficient information. Several knowledge translation 
platforms have been introduced in Burkina Faso to support evidence-informed decision-making. One of these is the 
rapid response service for health. This platform aims to provide quick access for policy-makers in Burkina Faso to high-
quality research evidence about health systems. The purpose of this study is to describe the process and extent of the 
institutionalization of the rapid response service.
Methods: A qualitative case study design was used, drawing on interviews with policy-makers, together with documentary 
analysis. Previously used institutionalization frameworks were combined to guide the analysis. 
Results: Burkina Faso’s rapid response service has largely reached the consolidation phase of the institutionalization 
process but not yet the final phase of maturity. The impetus for the project came from designated project leaders, who 
convinced policy-makers of the importance of the rapid response service, and obtained resources to run a pilot. During 
the expansion stage, additional policy-makers at national and sub-national levels began to use the service. Unit staff 
also tried to improve the way it was delivered, based on lessons learned during the pilot stage. The service has, however, 
stagnated at the consolidation stage, and not moved into the final phase of maturity. 
Conclusion: The institutionalization process for the rapid response service in Burkina Faso has been fluid rather than 
linear, with some areas developing faster than others. The service has reached the consolidation stage, but now requires 
additional efforts to reach maturity.
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Implications for policy makers
• The rapid response service has emerged as a streamlined approach to supporting urgent decision-making by policy-makers, enabling evidence 
to be synthesized in a timely manner.
• Institutionalization of a service like this requires a stable environment, a mandate from the government, and sufficient financial and human 
resources.
• Having a state budget line for a service will guarantee resource availability. 
• The institutionalization of a service like this does not necessarily follow a linear process, and those responsible should be prepared for this. 
• Even after a service has reached the consolidation stage, additional efforts may be required to help it reach maturity. 
Implications for the public
The rapid response service is a small unit within Burkina Faso’s health ministry, synthesizing evidence in a timely manner to support urgent decision-
making by policy-makers. It is hoped that this will result in policies that are informed by evidence, and therefore more likely to be cost-effective, 
and not waste taxpayers’ money. A more efficient policy-making process (with less time spent debating or trying things that are not supported by 
evidence) is also better value for taxpayers. This paper explains the process of establishing and building up such a unit, and how this can be supported 
to make it more likely to succeed. It is hoped that it will therefore be useful in supporting the setting up of future units in other policy areas or 
elsewhere in the world. This should enable a more rapid return on investment and secure foundation for these units.
Key Messages 
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Background
Decision-making is a cognitive process that results in the 
selection of a course of action from among several alternative 
scenarios. The decision is either rational or irrational, and 
based on explicit or tacit assumptions.1,2 This applies to 
all situations, including decision-making in health policy. 
Good decision-making requires the gathering of sufficient 
information.3 A good decision must not only reflect the 
preferences of the decision-maker but also be logical and 
based on the available information.4 Evidence from research, 
particularly high-quality research, is a useful and important 
source of reliable and up-to-date information in healthcare 
policy and policy-making more generally.5 Several studies 
have suggested that policy-making informed by evidence is 
likely to be more effective and less expensive.6-8 In practice, 
however, evidence from research is not always taken into 
account.
One review,9 for example, examined the use of health research 
in policy-making and its contribution to effective policies. It 
found that the level of research utilization by policy-makers 
was lower than it could be. Other reviews have identified 
factors influencing the use of research in decision-making 
among health policy-makers.10,11 These included interaction, 
trust and personal contact between researchers and policy-
makers, timeliness, the relevance of the research findings, 
the inclusion of summaries with clear recommendations, and 
power and budget struggles.
Some countries have therefore taken action at national level 
to link research to policy-making.12 One study looking at 
this national action used a framework to explain success 
in increasing the use of evidence. This framework has four 
components, suggesting that introducing evidence-driven 
policy-making is a complex process. The first assesses the 
general climate and how those who fund research, universities, 
researchers and users of research support or place value 
on efforts to link research to action. The second addresses 
the production of research, including how priority-setting 
ensures the identification of user needs and how scoping 
analyses, systematic reviews, and simple studies have been 
undertaken to meet these needs. The third addresses the use 
of a combination of activities to link research to action. 
These include four areas: 
(i) Efforts to “push” (or disseminate) research evidence to 
those who can act on it;
(ii) Efforts to support “user pull,” such as one-stop shops for 
high-quality reviews, or electronic libraries for health;
(iii) “User pull” itself, efforts undertaken by those who use 
research; and 
(iv) Exchange efforts, or how meaningful partnerships 
between researchers and users help them to jointly ask 
and answer relevant questions. 
The fourth component addresses approaches to evaluation, 
including how to support rigorous evaluation of efforts to link 
research to action. 
To improve use of evidence in policy-making, several 
knowledge translation platforms have been introduced in 
Burkina Faso to ‘push’ research evidence out to policy-makers, 
and respond to user ‘pull’ or demand for more information 
(areas (i) and (ii) from the third component of the framework 
described above). One of these is the Supporting the Use 
of Research Evidence (SURE) project’s health policy rapid 
response unit, run with European Union (EU) funding. 
This unit, which draws on a model used in Uganda,13,14 sits 
centrally in Burkina Faso’s health ministry. 
This unit runs a service (the rapid response service) to provide 
health policy-makers in Burkina Faso with rapid access to 
a summary of relevant research evidence about a particular 
area of health policy or the health system. This is designed 
to provide rapid access to detailed briefs of research evidence 
that address policy makers’ urgent questions about health 
systems. It aims to strengthen the quality and efficiency of 
health policy-making.15,16 The unit is staffed by two to three 
people, and service users are mainly central and local public 
sector policy-makers.
The future of this knowledge translation platform is, 
however, in doubt, as has often been the case with projects 
funded by donors and grants. The transition of such 
units into local ownership and ongoing sustainability (or 
‘institutionalization’) has often been fragile. Many have 
collapsed at the end of the donor funding period.17,18 The 
purpose of this study was therefore to describe the process 
and extent of institutionalization of the health policy rapid 
response unit. It also aimed to provide advice about how the 
process could be supported and improved in the future, to 
inform the future development of both this and other units.
Institutionalization
Institutionalization is the process by which a set of activities 
becomes an integral and sustainable part of a formal 
system. It can be seen as a sequence of events leading to 
“new practices becoming standard practice.”19 In this study, 
institutionalization refers to the continuation of the rapid 
response unit after withdrawal of support from the SURE 
project funded by the EU. 
Study Framework
Berger and Luckmann20 noted that “habituation precedes any 
institution.” Institutions whose activities were based primarily 
on recurrence were found to be considered “natural,” 
predictable and stable.21 The World Bank produced a three-
part framework on institutionalization, covering:
(i) Existence of an institutional framework;
(ii) Consistent production of relevant reports;
(iii) Adequate resource availability.
The first part of the framework suggests that habituation 
can be linked to the existence of an institutional framework 
(with a favorable environment and governance structure) 
that will encourage the ongoing performance of the activities 
concerned.22 This includes a formal mandate for the existence 
of a unit to implement those activities.23 This mandate clearly 
defines the roles and responsibilities required to avoid 
duplication of effort, maximize productivity and enhance 
understanding of stakeholders’ needs. As a result, a work 
plan and procedures are generally respected by all actors. The 
mandate also allows the development and consolidation of 
the habits of action within the organization.
Once a formal mandate has been provided to a unit, its 
activities can become normal behavior and be widely 
accepted. The activity is then not specific to the context or 
people involved but has been institutionalized.24 Standardized 
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behavior includes setting up consistent and routine data 
collection, data analysis and reporting.19,22 
The production of consistent data and the dissemination of 
results play a crucial supporting role in the institutionalization 
process. The World Bank framework noted that consistent 
data production develops capacity for consistent estimation 
methods.22 Information production and communication 
therefore facilitate implementation, and also encourage 
advocacy, strengthen the recognition of the unit’s merits, and 
support routine reporting. Routine data production needs 
to become a habit, but it takes time for this to happen.25 
Individuals are affected not only by empirical findings, but 
also external realities which are imposed on them.26 This 
applies both to the production of relevant reports and their 
use in decision-making and policy processes. This is therefore 
an important measure of the level of institutionalization.
One of the last steps in institutionalization is the availability of 
enough resources to implement activities.22 Institutionalization 
requires institutional learning and knowledge transfer within 
the unit.27 The transfer of knowledge about activities between 
generations of members of the unit assumes the presence of 
well-trained and capable human resources. This also implies 
the availability of financial and material resources to support 
continuity. The continued implementation of the activities 
helps to embed them as routines.27 The routine first becomes 
the norm, then gradually becomes a standard practice that is 
sustainable over time. 
Complementing the World Bank framework, five main 
transitional phases have been suggested for institutionalization: 
awareness, experimentation, expansion, consolidation and 
maturity.28,29 Each phase has particular characteristics and 
strategies. We used the World Bank three-part framework 
to measure the institutionalization of Burkina Faso’s rapid 
response service. This framework has been previously used 
to evaluate and assess institutionalization processes. Its use 
therefore ensures that this study is comparable with others. 
We grouped the five institutionalization phases under each 
of the three institutionalization factors in the World Bank 
framework to provide a structure for data analysis.
Methods 
This research was a qualitative and exploratory case study 
of the process and extent of the institutionalization of the 
Burkina Faso rapid response service. The study period was 
from March 2011 to August 2015 and included pilot and 
scale-up phases of the rapid response service implementation 
in Burkina Faso.
Data Sources and Recruitment 
Data were collected from interviews, documentation covering 
the rapid response unit’s implementation and strategies, and 
the personal knowledge of the principal researcher. 
Documents from the unit were used to identify information 
about policy-makers using the service (for example, their 
profiles, locations, questions asked and how frequently they 
sent questions and used the service). These documents 
also supplied information about the unit’s infrastructure 
(for example, its equipment, internet access and budget), 
funding and support (for example, the mandate, government 
willingness to support the unit and supplement EU funding, 
and activities supported by EU funding). Finally, the 
documents also recorded whether service users felt that the 
briefs produced by the unit were useful.
Potential interviewees were identified depending on how 
often they used the service and how aware they were of the 
unit’s work. Emails and phone calls were used to make contact 
before the interview. In total, 18 people were interviewed for 
this study: all were policy-makers within the Ministry of 
Health. An outline of the interview guide is given at Appendix 
1. Each interview was audio recorded, and notes were also 
taken by the interviewer. All but one of the participants were 
interviewed face-to-face; the other was interviewed via Skype, 
while out of the country. 
The principal investigator acted as a participant observer, 
having been the first full-time member of staff in the rapid 
response unit, and responsible for its implementation 
since January 2011. This researcher documented the 
implementation of the rapid response unit and service, 
including strategies, budgets and policy discussions. The 
study therefore drew on this researcher’s extensive knowledge 
of each phase of the service implementation to add details 
to supplement other resources. In particular, the researcher 
supplied more information about the type of policy-makers 
using the service. This included their location, the frequency 
of requests for briefs, and the types of questions asked. He also 
supplied documents about the progress of implementation of 
the unit, including development of its formal mandate and 
access to resources, and budget provision.
To ensure that the study remained objective, two other 
researchers were periodically consulted to triangulate the 
data and assure completeness of methods and findings. 
These researchers are co-authors of this paper, and were 
both working in the Ministry of Health, responsible for 
implementing the SURE project.
Data Analysis 
The data obtained from interviews were transcribed and 
coded by hand.30,31 The interviews were analyzed using 
qualitative thematic analysis.25 The relevant documents and 
reports were systematically tabulated and analyzed. Data from 
the document analysis were triangulated with the qualitative 
data from interviews.32,33 
Results
Table 1 shows strategies used in the rapid response unit across 
each of the main elements of the World Bank Framework, and 
the five phases for a service institutionalization process.17,26 
These are the internal elements around which the unit 
concentrated its efforts to ensure its long-term survival: its 
‘action plan’ for institutionalization. 
Table 2 summarizes the principal findings from the data 
collection. It shows the location of each element of the rapid 
response service and the phase of its institutionalization: the 
reality of the progress of institutionalization over time. It 
helps to identify where effort should be focused to achieve 
full institutionalization of the rapid response unit.
The next sections draw from the interview data to explore 
each of the three areas of the World Bank framework in more 
detail.22 They examine the implementation process, and assess 
which stage29 the unit has reached for each area.
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Table 1. Characteristics and Strategies of Each Stage of Institutionalization22,29
 
Phases
Existence of an Institutional Framework Consistent Production of Relevant Reports Adequate Resources
Strategies Strategies Strategies 
Awareness Demonstrate the need for improvement in the policy process. Discuss the format of rapid response briefs. Demonstrate the need for improvement in the policy process.
Create awareness of the new service among policy-makers. Create awareness of the format of briefs among policy-makers. Demonstrate the need for resources to implement the rapid response 
service.
Plant the idea of evidence driving improvement. Plant the idea of evidence driving improvement. Plant the idea of evidence driving improvement.
Experimentation Implement small-scale activities to test the new service and 
demonstrate need for institutional support.
Implement small-scale activities to test the new service. Implement small-scale activities to test the new service. 
Develop work plan, use guide materials, and discuss how the 
unit fits with existing units.
Learn from elsewhere, and from meetings and workshops. Develop budget plan and document needs (financial, equipment, internet 
connection).
Discuss the government mandate. Recruit policy-makers and start to get requests for briefs. Discuss the location of the unit with stakeholders.
Share examples of briefs from elsewhere and develop our own.  
Expansion Develop expansion strategies (goals, priorities, implementation 
plans).
Develop expansion strategies (goals, priorities, implementation 
plans).
Develop expansion strategies (goals, priorities, implementation plans).
Develop consensus among policy-makers that the service should 
be continued.
Increase organizational capacity to support the unit. Build capacity and develop leadership in the unit. 
Share innovation, cost savings and results. Strategic expansion of unit activities in scale and scope. Share innovation, cost savings and results. 
Demonstrate improved service quality through the unit’s 
activities.
Demonstrate improved service quality through the unit’s activities.
Consolidation Identify missing or lagging activities and providing them. Embed unit activities into standard organizational operations, and 
add lagging or missing activities.
Recruit and train additional staff. 
Enhance coordination of unit strategy and activities. Fully integrate a balanced set of activities into the everyday working 
of the Ministry.
Develop mechanism to motivate staff.
Continue support for learning within and beyond the unit. Obtain state budget line for the unit.
Maturity Values, leadership, policy and resources are sufficient. Unit is carrying out all possible activities. Office, equipment, and high speed internet is available to the unit. 
The service is formally and philosophically an integral part of the 
health system.
Unit has access to suitable evidence databases. Values, leadership, policy and resources are sufficient.
Unit is sharing experience with other countries. State budget line is available for the unit.
Zida et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2018, 7(1), 15–26 19
Table 2. Evolution of Essential Elements of the Rapid Response Service During Each Phase of Institutionalization
Institutionalization Phase
Institutionalization Elements
Existence of an Institutional Framework Consistent Production of Relevant Reports Adequate Resources 
Awareness
•	 Awareness phase started from October 2010 to February 
2011
•	 At the beginning of the SURE project, key policy actors were 
introduced to the unit concept by the project leaders
•	 SURE project leaders used meetings to emphasize the 
potential value added by the unit
•	 Key decision-makers became aware of the unit and were 
willing to allow its establishment even without formal 
approval 
•	 Key high level policy-makers approved the formation of the 
unit as a pilot 
•	 Key leaders agreed to support the unit
•	 Key decision-makers became aware of the benefits of the 
unit and agreed to create mechanisms to strengthen it
•	 Key stakeholders expressed a need for unit briefs for 
urgent decision-making
•	 Unit leaders were encouraged to explain the new service 
during official meetings 
•	 No Burkina Faso briefs were available, but a Ugandan 
brief was used as an example 
•	 Minimum resources made available through donor support 
(SURE project money) for the pilot 
•	 Officials provided support for further examination of options 
for improving policy-making
•	 Staff drew on experience from elsewhere, including other 
countries with similar units
•	 Unit leaders recognized the need to develop mechanisms or 
processes to reward quality work and staff effort
•	 The EU supported the rapid response unit with 16 500 USD, 
for capacity building, for experience learning elsewhere for 
one person, meetings, advocacy, and communication
•	 It was agreed that staff needed to speak English 
•	 The issue of internet access was raised 
Experimentation/pilot
•	 Experimental phase started from March to December 2011, 
without formal policy approval
•	 Consensus developed among stakeholders of the importance 
of including the unit in the policy process
•	 There was a discussion about including the unit in wider 
Ministry of Health reform process 
•	 The power to extend the unit’s activities was delegated to 
the Research Directorate for Health, and the unit was given 
access to directorate resources
•	 Fundamental values supporting a culture of quality were set 
out and accepted by unit staff
•	 The Ministry of Health officially allowed unit staff to contact 
policy-makers directly
•	 The unit was provided with management, facilitation 
and coaching and access to the required knowledge and 
skills
•	 A consensus developed on how to generate capacity to 
enable experimentation
•	 Briefs from Uganda were used as examples 
•	 Policy-makers using the unit documented activities and 
shared this with others
•	 Implementation guidelines and materials were 
developed 
•	 The unit was working with a small network of five to ten 
policy-makers
•	 The unit produced at least two briefs per month, 
continuing to draw on advice from the Ugandan unit to 
improve their quality
•	 EU funding was used to finance the experimentation costs, 
and resources were made available to visit the Ugandan unit 
•	 Office, internet, and equipment were provided by the 
Research Directorate for Health 
•	 Unit leaders recognized the need for supervision, 
coordination and clear responsibilities for unit expansion, 
which were provided by SURE project leaders
•	 A consensus developed about appropriate and effective 
structures for the pilot phase
•	 Managers accepted that resource constraints would affect 
quality, and so developed incentive programs to improve 
quality
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Expansion
•	 Expansion phase ran from January 2012 to August 2015 (44 
months), and involved recruiting more policy-makers, 23 in 
total
•	 In 2012, the unit was officially included in the Ministry’s 
organization chart, and incorporated into the directorate’s 
strategic documents
•	 Expansion policies were developed (implementation 
guidelines, tools, flyers, and other communication materials) 
•	 Policies were developed to encourage unit evaluation and 
continuous improvement
•	 The staff were able to articulate the fundamental values of 
the unit
•	 The unit’s core values could be seen to guide its development
•	 There was a critical mass of competent staff to support 
the unit’s work
•	 The unit’s manager led by example, to demonstrate the 
unit’s values and procedures 
•	 Mechanisms and systems were established for routine 
documentation of results and to support learning
•	 The unit’s leaders were involved in ongoing advocacy for 
the service
•	 The unit began to work with more policy-makers, 
including at the subnational level, and produce more 
briefs 
•	 23 Policy-makers sent 78 questions in 44 months, with 
an average of 1.7 questions per month
•	 Realistic unit budgets were established, based on the true 
costs of implementation 
•	 A dedicated staffing level of three was agreed
•	 New staff were hired, but retention was a problem because 
of working conditions (language and internet problems) 
•	 A directorate was identified to house the unit, and resources 
provided, but internet access remained a problem
•	 Unit strategies were refined after internal evaluation
•	 The Ministry of Health agreed to reward quality but did not 
provide additional funding
•	 The need for a budget line was raised but not resolved, 
although EU funding was made available to support ongoing 
work 
•	 The EU supported the expansion phase with US$23 616 for 
salaries for two people, advocacy activities, IT equipment 
maintenance and internet connection office supplies, and 
travel
Consolidation
•	 Unit policies for continuous improvement were established. 
Resources were available and core values and policies are 
consistent
•	 Operational managers feel responsible for the quality; they 
provide leadership for the unit’s activities and are willing to 
promote it 
•	 The performance of staff and managers reflects the unit’s 
fundamental values
•	 Awards and programs are in place to support these values
•	 Since June 2013, changes within the unit’s home directorate 
have led to some instability within and beyond the unit 
•	 There is a mechanism to perpetuate the expertise of 
the unit, and systems for documentation, information-
sharing and advocacy operate routinely
•	 Some policy-makers routinely send questions but others 
need to be encouraged
•	 The unit provides evidence for policy development and 
other work 
•	 Briefs are used for decision-making but tracking this is 
not always easy
•	 The unit has been asked to look at the use of evidence in 
policy-making, which is beyond its mandate
•	 Estimated resource needs are incorporated into the annual 
strategic plan but not funded
•	 The unit has additional staff supporting work on briefs
•	  All unit staff can describe how their work contributes to 
improving quality of briefs for urgent decision-making
•	 The Ministry has committed to providing resources, but not 
yet made them available
•	 State budget paid salaries, office and equipment amounting 
to US$6345
•	 The staff believe reward mechanisms are fair
•	 There are mechanisms to enable policy-makers to suggest 
how to improve the unit’s work
•	 The unit has an office, but internet capacity is still limited 
and staff cannot download evidence on site
•	 Advocacy for a government budget line continues after SURE 
project funding ended
Abbreviations: SURE, Supporting the Use of Research Evidence; EU, European Union.
Table 2. Continued
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Existence of an institutional framework 
Government practice in Burkina Faso’s health system is 
that service implementation requires several elements. 
These include approval from high-level policy-makers, the 
establishment of technical committees and a decree signed by 
the Minister of Health or the Secretary General of the Ministry 
of Health. This process was started for the rapid response 
unit, and meant that many policy-makers were aware of its 
existence before implementation. One of the SURE project 
implementers said: 
“…at the earlier stage of SURE project activities 
implementation, including the Rapid Response Service, 
we presented the project proposal at a committee meeting 
chaired by the secretary general of the Ministry of Health. 
As you know, we also introduced the Rapid Response Service 
mechanism during the EVIPNet annual meeting held in 
2010 and participants were excited to see the Rapid Response 
Service briefs and see how it would help them in their policy 
making...” (Senior policy-maker).
The pilot phase, however, which corresponds to the 
experimental phase of the study framework,29 began before 
this policy process was complete. This was because of the 
involvement of the Minister of Health’s adviser. He was one 
of the key players responsible for the SURE project in the 
country, which supported the rapid response service. He and 
the principal researcher, in his role within the unit, therefore 
took action to raise awareness and attract business by direct 
personal contact and presentations about the use of the rapid 
response service. The adviser also started to suggest that the 
unit should be incorporated formally into the Ministry of 
Health’s organization chart. 
During the pilot phase, policy-makers began to familiarize 
themselves with the rapid response service, showing that the 
use of “simple rules” is acceptable without a formal mandate 
such as a decree.34 One interviewee noted that providing 
value was probably more important than formal mandate for 
policy-makers to use the service, but the formal mandate was 
required for long-term survival:
“…before policy-makers support service implementation, 
you should show the added value of the service and after 
that, you will see every policy-maker defending the service 
at decision-making meetings. Usually, to sustain service 
implementation within the Ministry of Health, [you need to] 
make sure you get an official mandate from the Minister of 
Health…” (Senior policy-maker).
As an organization progresses towards the expansion phase, 
more specific operational policies become important.35 As 
the scale and scope of the rapid response unit’s activities 
widened, the principal researcher, as unit head, observed 
that more clarity was needed on what could be delivered to 
particular deadlines, especially because of problems with 
internet access. It would also have helped to have flexibility 
in the implementation and the delegation of powers to carry 
out improvements. During this phase, the unit recruited 
more policy-makers at national and sub-national level, and 
developed written guidelines for the service. Feedback from 
service users was positive. The project also received its 
official mandate in this phase. In 2012, the Ministry of Health 
officially included the service in its organization chart, as part 
of the general directorate for health information and health 
statistics (DGISS).36 This gave the unit access to additional 
directorate resources for implementation. It will eventually 
enable the rapid response service to obtain a budget line in 
the Ministry’s state budget. One policy-maker noted: 
“….because the rapid response service is new in the health 
system, maybe to make sure you get permanent financial 
resources, it should be located under another unit, under 
an influential director who will able to defend the service 
anytime…..also during the unit’s period of planned 
operational donor funding, the rapid response service can 
present its operational plan and get funded by the donors” 
(Senior policy-maker).
Consistent Production of Policy-Relevant Reports 
The consistent production of policy-relevant reports was 
crucial to the unit’s survival. Policy-makers were quick to see 
the value of the unit’s reports, with one saying:
“…In one of the policy meetings, one of your briefs was 
important to me; I was speaking with evidence, papers, 
references and examples from other countries. When I 
started to talk, the others could not speak again because I 
was not talking about my experience but evidence…some 
of the summaries in your brief were part of our meeting 
conclusion” (Senior policy-maker).
Another service user also noted, however, that maintaining 
quality was vital: 
 “…for example, if I have a meeting or a discussion with my 
supervisors and if I send you a question, and you cannot 
send me a brief with substantial evidence to support my 
arguments by the time that I need it, do you think I will 
come back to you again?” (Junior policy-maker). 
Information and communication between the unit and 
policy-makers were therefore important to ensure that the 
right questions were answered in the right time-frame. They 
also strengthened awareness and recognition of the merits 
of the service. Each phase of institutionalization presented 
different challenges. These included
•	 The definition of specific goals for data collection and 
communication;
•	 The identification of obstacles to the achievement of 
these goals;
•	 The development of profiles for the different target 
audiences (small or larger policy groups at the central 
or sub-national level, within or beyond the Ministry of 
Health);
•	 The segmentation and prioritization of target audiences;
•	 The choice of communication messages, equipment and 
channels for each group;
•	 The pre-testing of service outputs;
•	 The evaluation of user satisfaction and the use of 
feedback to refine communications; and 
•	 Recognizing and rewarding staff. 
Sharing practices from Uganda13,14 was useful to increase 
stakeholder interest during the awareness phase, which was 
in turn useful for the pilot phase. For example, one of the first 
users of the service observed:
“My decision to use the service came after you showed me 
an example [brief] from another country [Uganda].…
although it was in English, the format was really attractive 
and user friendly, and I was able to read it and understand 
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the content….Once you sent back the briefs, I and another 
user, I believe, would also have loved to get the paper from 
where you summarized your responses” (Policy-maker).
There were clear indications that the unit was moving into 
the next phase. These included regular documentation from 
those using or experimenting with the rapid response service, 
and the sharing of experience with various target audiences. 
During the experimental phase (from March to December 
2011), the unit worked closely with Uganda’s rapid response 
service to deliver five briefs, under the supervision of two 
of the researchers, who had responsibility for implementing 
the SURE project in Burkina Faso. This gave the team the 
opportunity to learn from the Ugandan experience. The 
experimental phase started with four policy-makers from the 
central level (based in the capital city, Ouagadougou). Five 
briefs were delivered in 9 months. 
Delivery during the awareness and experimental phases 
increased expectations among stakeholders that the unit 
would be able to deliver high-quality briefs on demand. As 
demand increased, this became difficult to manage because 
of the unit’s limited resources. Of the 64 questions that fit the 
remit, the unit was able to respond in a timely way to just 
51, or 79.7%. The main reason for not being able to address 
the other questions was often the poor internet connection 
in the Ministry of Health, or in Ouagadougou. Other reasons 
included not being able to find evidence to address the 
question on time, or cancellation of the need from the user, for 
example, because their policy meeting was cancelled. Some 
questions were sent late, giving only a day to respond. This 
caused some problems, as one participant from the Ministry 
of Health commented: 
“…at the beginning I was getting my briefs on time from the 
rapid response service and they were relevant, but I did not 
get my last brief on time. We understand that you sometimes 
have difficulties, but we do not want to get used to something 
that you cannot continue...” (Senior policy-maker).
It is fair to say that some of the briefs did not meet the users’ 
needs for speed, quality and contextualization. The unit 
almost became a victim of its own success, and can reasonably 
be said to remain at the expansion phase for this criterion. 
Improving the quality of delivery with increased resources 
may be essential to move beyond this. Currently, the unit 
does not track the use of its briefs to ensure that they inform 
policy-making, and this evaluation will be necessary to move 
to the next phase. 
Adequate Resources
The resource requirements for the rapid response service 
varied across the phases of institutionalization, but various 
investments have been recognized as necessary to enable 
the unit to reach maturity (for example, capacity building, 
experimentation, learning English, and the time dedicated by 
officials to supporting the process of institutionalization). The 
size of these investments varied over time.
At the awareness phase, some high-level decision-makers 
saw the service as too expensive. However, the unit was 
able to demonstrate that activities like elimination of errors, 
duplication and inefficiencies in service implementation 
would save money. The unit start-up required some additional 
resources, but the actual costs related to the unit’s operation 
depended on staff time. During this phase, resources were 
needed for salaries, capacity building, to learn from experience 
elsewhere, meetings, advocacy, and communication by the 
SURE project team. These costs, estimated at US$16 500, were 
fully funded by the EU. Of these costs, 47% was for capacity 
building and learning from Uganda, 38% for equipment and 
15% for advocacy activities at the central level. 
The resources for the experimentation phase (US$13 095) 
were also provided by the EU and covered salary (56%), 
advocacy meetings (10%), guideline development (10%), 
internet connections (7%), in-country training (7%) and 
office supplies (1%). The total cost for the expansion phase 
was US$23 616 and was also fully funded by the EU. During 
this phase, the Ministry of Health held some discussions 
about supporting the unit through provision of an office, 
additional staff, and equipment. The expansion cost covered 
salaries for two people (79%), advocacy activities (10%), IT 
equipment maintenance and internet connection (8%), office 
supplies (2%), and travel (1%). The resource needs during the 
expansion phase included capacity-building, communication 
mechanisms, reward systems and leadership development. 
Many of these costs required initial investment but were 
expected to decrease later. During this phase, the unit was 
allowed to draw on Ministry resources, although its main 
source of funding remained the EU. 
Finally, the unit has now moved into a transition period in 
terms of resource availability, which probably corresponds to 
the consolidation stage in our framework.29 The budget for 
staff salaries, office and equipment (US$6345) was funded 
by the government. The office, however, had no internet 
connection, and there were no funds to support additional 
activities such as communication, advocacy, and training. 
There was also still no dedicated budget line for the unit in 
the Ministry of Health’s accounts. This was often mentioned 
by study participants, with one policy-maker suggesting: 
“…in the Ministry of Health, to guarantee resource 
availability, you should make sure there is a budget line code 
for the rapid response service in the state budget” (Senior 
policy-maker).
Discussion 
Data from interviews, documents and the knowledge of the 
principal researcher demonstrate that the rapid response unit 
has moved towards institutionalization, and is becoming a 
formal part of the health policy system.19 We consider that 
the unit will be fully institutionalized, or ‘at maturity’ when 
it is part of the Ministry of Health’s organization chart, with a 
clear mandate and dedicated budget line, and when a majority 
of policy-makers regularly send requests for information, and 
use the briefs supplied to support decision-making. 
Our results suggest that the unit is further ahead on some 
areas than others. First, the mandate for the unit was clearly 
established during the pilot phase. The unit was included 
within a directorate at the Ministry of Health shortly after 
the pilot was completed, during what we have characterized 
as the expansion phase.36 This would suggest that the unit 
is reasonably well-established in formal terms, with a clear 
understanding available of its place in both the structure and 
function of the Ministry. We suggest that in terms of a clear 
mandate, the unit is well into the consolidation phase, and 
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could even be considered as reaching maturity. 
Second, influential decision-makers were aware from the start 
that the unit could make a valuable contribution to policy-
making.13,37 In particular, detailed briefs were seen to save time 
and cost and increase visibility in decision-making.38 Policy-
makers commented that the briefs enabled them to speak 
with authority in meetings. The expansion of operations from 
‘a few’ to ‘the majority’ of policy-makers is a process that will 
take time. However, the unit has seen its operations expand 
in both scope and scale during its lifetime. Expansion has 
been geographical (from central to regional level), reinforced 
by increasing the number of policy-makers using the service 
and therefore the number of questions received. SURE project 
guidelines, the pilot phase in Burkina Faso and the experience 
in Uganda all suggest that the best strategy is to start with 
a small group and keep recruiting among the same target 
group.13,39 In this area, therefore, the unit is probably at the 
expansion to consolidation stage.
However, the issue of resources has been harder to address. 
Most of the financial and technical support for the unit has 
come from the SURE project via EU funding. Units that are 
entirely dependent on donor resources have tended to close or 
end at least some of their activities when the external funding 
stops.17,18 While some government funds have been provided 
in recent stages, this funding falls far short of what has 
previously been provided by the EU. Adequate internet access 
remains a challenge, although it is vital for the unit’s ongoing 
function. If the government is serious about retaining the 
unit, it will need to provide dedicated funding and adequate 
resources. Without these resources, the unit will fail despite 
its clear mandate, because it will be unable to satisfy the needs 
of policy-makers, who will therefore cease to use it.
Both Tables 1 and 2 show a theoretical state, with clear 
separation between the phases of institutionalization. 
However, it is clear from Table 1 that there is potential for the 
strategies to overlap between phases, and from Table 2 that 
the unit moved forward at different speeds across different 
areas. In practice, therefore, this study shows that the phases 
of institutionalization29 overlap, and that there is often little 
clear demarcation between them.
It was reasonably easy to identify the end of the pilot 
(experimental) phase and the beginning of the expansion 
phase. However, it was much harder to tell where exactly the 
expansion phase ended, and the consolidation phase began. 
This confirms that in practice, there is considerable overlap 
between phases. This is partly because of the challenges 
to implementing a rapid response service in a low-income 
country.40,41 First, recruiting policy-makers to send questions 
was difficult. Second, when they started to use the service, it 
was hard to support and retain them, while also recruiting 
additional policy-makers. The unit struggled to maintain the 
quality and speed of response as demand grew. In practice, 
it proved impossible to satisfy all the policy-makers, and 
some did not send any further requests. Third, internet 
availability and access to evidence to provide timely responses 
to urgent requests was an issue. When expansion strategies 
are implemented, they bring forward or encourage the need 
to make an assessment of activities. This paves the way 
for a review period, involving professional development, 
adjustment, and coordination.42 This naturally leads to 
consolidation. At the same time, however, expansion was still 
ongoing, with both awareness-raising activities and additional 
recruitment of policy-makers. 
Previous work12 suggested that linking research to action 
required activity across a range of areas. The general climate 
must support the link between research and action. We have 
seen in the rapid response unit that backing from a senior 
figure (the adviser to the Minister for Health) was an essential 
driver in starting to implement the unit. There also needs to 
be both ‘user pull’ and ‘push’ to disseminate research findings. 
The unit’s progress shows that while policy-makers needed to 
provide questions (‘user pull’), the unit staff and advocates for 
its success also needed to spend time raising awareness and 
encouraging policy-makers to consider using the service. 
The unit’s mandate does not cover other elements of 
the framework,12 such as influencing the production of 
research, or linking policy-makers direct to researchers. 
Senior decision-makers may need to consider whether these 
activities are also necessary to increase the use of evidence in 
policy-making. If so, the unit’s mandate might be expanded 
to cover them, or another unit given this task. Future studies 
may help to address this point. The findings of this study also 
show that the unit’s activities have, to date, not addressed the 
final component of the framework, evaluation. The unit head 
kept records of whether the briefs were considered useful 
by policy-makers. It may, however, be helpful for the unit to 
track the effect of its briefs on policy. This would enable it to 
assess both that the briefs informed policy-making, and also 
whether policy-making supported by evidence is genuinely 
more effective. This would enable the unit to ensure that its 
continued existence and institutionalization can be justified.
This study of the institutionalization of the rapid response 
unit is the first of its kind in Burkina Faso. However, at the 
international level, the World Bank has conducted case 
studies in eight countries to examine the specific challenges 
of institutionalization.43 The lessons learned from other 
countries on health units’ institutionalization suggest that 
weaknesses in data-generating systems and links to public 
expenditure management (especially in a decentralized 
context), together with difficulties in tracking private health 
expenditure flows, are among the main reasons why progress 
toward institutionalization has been minimal.43 This suggests 
that this unit is not unique in struggling with resources to 
generate quality reports, and also that evaluation of its impact 
will also be key to full implementation. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Study
The principal investigator had a key role as a participant-
observer in the rapid response service implementation process. 
This could be both a strength and a weakness. The involvement 
of a researcher provides a check against participants’ subjective 
reporting, and helps to ensure consistency, along with other 
checks and balances. Participant observation is valuable for 
understanding the physical, economic, cultural, and social 
contexts in which interviewees live and work. It also informs 
understanding of the relationships between stakeholders, 
ideas, contexts, norms, events and behaviors and activities 
related to unit institutionalization.44,45 It can, however, 
introduce bias, particularly in selection of data supporting 
certain points of view. In this study, we therefore took steps 
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to avoid bias. In particular, we engaged external experts who 
were familiar with the rapid response service and the health 
system in Burkina Faso to review the study’s major findings.
The second strength is that the study drew extensively on work 
from Uganda, as well as the World Bank framework and other 
literature, to understand the process required to establish a 
rapid response service unit in Burkina Faso, and particularly 
to identify factors that could affect institutionalization in 
Burkina Faso. 
This study also had some weaknesses. The first is that it drew 
on policy-makers as interviewees. Their knowledge of the 
service, however, was limited to using it, and many did not 
know much about its early organization. These data were 
supplemented by the knowledge of the principal researcher, 
who had been involved in the unit from its inception. The 
sample size was also relatively small, at just 18 interviewees. 
This is, however, reasonable for a qualitative study, particularly 
because the available population (those who had used and 
understood the service) was also limited. 
Implications for Future Studies 
The study has evaluated the process and extent of the 
institutionalization of the health policy rapid response unit 
in Burkina Faso. It has focused in particular on the earlier 
stages of the unit’s implementation, when the unit was mainly 
funded by the EU. This touches on one of the most intriguing 
areas for further research about the sustainability and long-
term financing of such units. We therefore suggest that future 
studies might investigate the funding mechanism of the unit 
more closely. In particular, they might evaluate the level of 
national ownership needed to support such units in the longer 
term. Researchers might also explore the benefits of the unit’s 
activities for urgent decision-making and the use of evidence 
to support policy-making. 
This study used five main transitional phases to examine 
the institutionalization of a particular unit. It therefore 
contributes to our understanding of the dynamics linking 
institutionalization to each of these five phases. However, it 
has also highlighted some gaps in the activities of the unit. 
Future studies should evaluate, for example, gaps in the service. 
They could also explore the expansion and consolidation 
phases, examine the impact of the unit and look at resource 
availability. All these affect the long-term future of the service.
In the section on consistent production of policy-relevant 
reports, we pointed out that tracking the use of the briefs for 
urgent decision-making is not always easy. Demand from 
policy-makers has to be stimulated by personal contact to 
generate and encourage new users. More investigation of the 
impact of the rapid response unit’s briefs in the policy-making 
process would be a useful area to explore, as would how the 
service attracts new users.
Implications for Policy and Practice
This study reports on the implementation of a small unit 
providing a rapid response evidence synthesis service in 
Burkina Faso. In practice, the different steps highlighted 
in unit institutionalization could be used to support and 
strengthen the implementation of other units in Burkina 
Faso, or rapid response services in other countries. The study 
will be useful to policy-makers in considering specific phases 
and the factors that are the most relevant to each. In Burkina 
Faso, the study framework and findings could assist the 
Ministry of Health to plan and focus its efforts and resources 
to strengthen and sustain the unit’s implementation. 
Conclusion
The institutionalization process for the rapid response service 
in Burkina Faso has been fluid rather than linear. There were 
several key components that led to service institutionalization. 
First, the unit obtained an official government mandate. 
Second, it proved that it could produce briefs in response 
to urgent questions from policy-makers in a timely manner, 
providing appraised and synthesized research evidence. 
Finally, the unit needs permanent availability of financial 
resources. Five main transitional phases have been used to 
assess service institutionalization. These were awareness, 
experimentation, expansion, consolidation and maturity. The 
service has largely reached the stage of either expansion or 
consolidation, but will require considerable additional effort 
to reach maturity.
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Appendix 1. Outline of Interview Questions
The interviews covered three areas. 
1)	 The rapid response service implementation environment 
What are the environmental factors which could lead to the institutionalization of the rapid response service? 
What are the political factors which are important to the ongoing success of the unit? 
Is there legislation or a policy that was required for the unit? 
Should the unit be incorporated into an existing directorate or should it exist as an independent entity? If yes which directorate do 
you think should be good for the rapid response service?
How can the service be institutionalized? Based on your experience in the Burkina Faso health system what are the different steps 
to institutionalized a unit like the rapid response service?
2)	 Production of consistent data and dissemination of results 
What do you see as the mechanisms of accountability within the unit? 
How should data be presented to support the unit’s institutionalization? 
How must the data be collected, stored and analyzed? 
What should be the frequency of data/rapid response briefs production? 
Must there be a strategy for dissemination of results? How can we track the use of the rapid response brief for decision-making?
Who might be the main actors to use the rapid response service?  And how can we recruit them and maintain them to frequently 
use the rapid response service for their urgent decision-making? 
Should the data and results be used for the development of policies or to support decisions? 
3)	 What do you see as the human, equipment and financial resources needed by the unit in the longer term (both quality and 
quantity)? 
What does the unit’s capacity need to be to do its job? 
What are the hardware resources needed by the unit (quality, quantity, type)? 
We have challenges maintaining coworker in the rapid response service because of the language issue to summarize the briefs 
(most of the evidence are in English) in the Francophone country, what is your advice? 
Internet connection is one of the main resources de deliver the briefs on time, what might be the unit strategy to get permanent/
stable internet connection? 
How can the unit be funded in the longer term? What funding sources must it have?
State budget line is one of the key components to support the rapid response unit financial institutionalization, how that can be 
done? What is the usual process for a unit in the Ministry of Health to be funded by the state budget?
